the statistics: international trade boomed during this period, the world economy grew at an assuring rate of 5-6 percent a year, sovereign ratings kept improving. In short, there was not much to worry about the financial sustainability of these emerging markets.
The optimistic mood and factual data seemed to support each other: trade and financial flows remained strong between the developed world and the (limited) number of successful emerging nations, underpinning the general view that both parties benefited from liberalized foreign trade and financial openness (even if historic data do not fully support such optimistic views 1 ). The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the international lender of last resort, had a very quiet period in its otherwise busy history: no new client turned to it for funds in emergency.
The mood changed abruptly by the end of 2008. Surprisingly, the financial crises of 2007-8 erupted not in the periphery of the world economy, but at its very core: in the United States. Much has been said about the reasons and factors leading somewhat unexpectedly to the subprime crisis in the American economy.
2 Yet, it is equally surprising how less obvious targets were instantly hit by the financial turbulences: Iceland, a rich and developed country, and Hungary, a member state of the European Union (EU) since 2004. These were the first two European countries in three decades to turn to the IMF for funds to avoid financial collapse in late 2008, soon followed by smallish Latvia, a Baltic state, and then the Ukraine, not a member of the EU.
The banking and financial crisis of tiny Iceland could be regarded an accident, or a sad but understandable consequence of bankers ' over-lending. 3 Compared to that, the Hungarian case looks more puzzling and thought provoking in the whole context of global financial order: the size of the country is larger, and its economy is closely connected with other emerging markets in the region as well as with the core economies of Europe.
When the first pieces of news appeared about the troubles with Hungary, the market understanding was that what was happening to Hungary could possibly unleash a domino effect among some other indebted emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe. This aspect must have been one of the reasons why, in November 2008, the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) swiftly put together with the EU an impressively large 20 billion euro lending facility for Hungary, a medium-size country with a gross domestic product (GDP) of about 100 billion euro, when the country was suddenly hit by a set of negative shocks.
What follows is, first, a review of the events during, before and after the financial turbulences in 2008 involving European emerging
